Do Syrian Communities Perceive Former IS Combatants as a Threat?

In the aftermath of the fall of the Islamic State (IS) in early 2019, Al-Hol became the larger of two Kurdish-run displacement camps for former IS militants and their families in north-eastern Syria (NES). The camp accounted for more than 60,000 individuals in late 2020, mostly Syrians (37%) and Iraqis (28%), in addition to smaller numbers of other nationalities. As per UN (October 2020) statistics, women and children accounted for over 80% of the Al-Hol population. The Kurdish-led Syria Democratic Forces (SDF) began managing the camp in 2019 and released between 7,500 to 8,000 Syrian Islamic State combatants and their families back to communities of Deir-ez-Zor and Raqqa.

Following the last batch of releases in December 2020, MECS undertook to assess the extent to which former IS combatants and their families are, indeed, reintegrating back into society. MECS targeted over 800 respondents including former IS combatants, tribal leaders, and community members, and used a mixed-method approach that involved public opinion surveys, secondary data review, and key informant interviews.

This is the third and last in a series of short articles, sharing data-driven analysis on the matter.

Unsurprisingly, most alleged families of former IS combatants that MECS teams met with presented the same two characteristics. First, most (71%) were female-headed households. The male bread winner had either been killed (37%), had disappeared (15%), was still detained in an SDF run facility (13%), or suffered severe injuries and/or disabilities as a result of the fighting (6%). Second, due to their over-exposure to war, the average family size was smaller (5.1 members per household) than the average Syrian family in the same geography (6.3 persons per household, as per demographic data MECS collected for prior undertakings).

Community perception of alleged former IS combatants and their families was fairly supportive. While 33% of respondents had a negative image of former IS combatants, 38% reported a “neutral attitude” and 16% a positive one.

MECS sought to unpack the latter percentage and understand why one out of six respondents reported a positive image of former IS combatants. Participants justified their opinion by explaining that a number of former IS combatants in their communities are locals who had no ideological motivation when joining IS, did so out of idleness, fear and the search of economic subsistence, and had not taken part in extremist practices or atrocities while serving IS in their community. Participants’ perception of the former combatants’ families featured higher rates of “neutral” and “positive.” Interviews highlighted that participants did not hold families responsible for choices made by heads of families, and displayed sympathy and forgiveness towards women and children who were usually from local tribes and had existing affiliations with the surrounding population.

The finding was corroborated by a complementary set of polls with IS combatants and families. They mostly deemed that communities were either “neutral” (62%) or “positive” (14%) towards them. Only 23% of the respondents felt at the receiving end of “negative” sentiment, and mostly in Raqqa.

While communities may support the reintegration process in principle, and trust in their tribal leaders’ leverage to implement it, they nonetheless view former IS combatants and their families as a threat. 70% of those polled either agreed or strongly agreed that former combatants present a long-term risk to the communities they are reintegrating to. Mostly, respondents feared that former fighters may re-join any IS-like violent extremist group in the future, should the local security situation deteriorate, or regional conflict dynamics shift significantly.

Interestingly, the perception of the risk is only slightly higher when asking about former IS combatants still currently detained in SDF run facilities. Should these be released and allowed to return to communities in Raqqa and Der-ez-Zor, 76% of those polled deemed it a risk (either “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that they present a long term risk). The widely shared assumption was that former fighters who remain in detention are more likely to have demonstrated strong ideological commitment, to have had positions of authority in IS, or committed crimes during their involvement with IS.

What about the children? Selected respondents perceive the sons and daughters of former IS combatants to be the biggest risk to their community. This was especially the case in Raqqa, where 40% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with letting the “IS children” attend schools alongside their own children, fearing they may be exposed to “the seeds of the next generation of IS supporters.” As a result, respondents would rather shield their own children from IS ideology, which many fear remains engrained in the mindset of the former combatants’ children. This perspective contrasts strongly with Der-ez-Zor, where respondents had the opposite reaction and deemed that enrolling former combatants’ children in mainstream schools was the only way to prevent their isolation and the possible reemergence of IS ideology. 94.5% of the Der-ez-Zor respondents hence “agreed” or “strongly agreed” to integrating former combatants’ children in local schools, where they would mix and socialize with the rest of the community’s children.

Across both Raqqa and Der-ez-Zor, 87% of the former IS combatants’ families MECS spoke with, have children of school age. Of that caseload, about two-thirds (62%) reported that the children work. They may do so full time, work and study at the same time, or mostly work during holidays.

Do they have access to humanitarian assistance? 52% of former combatants’ families interviewed reported benefitting from humanitarian assistance over the past 3 months. This number masks disparities at the subnational level, whereby 67% of the families of former combatants polled by MECS in Der-ez-Zor report having had access to humanitarian assistance in the previous three months, against only 38% of respondents in Raqqa. Assistance provided included health assistance, food baskets, food vouchers, unconditional cash, winterization kits and livestock and agriculture support.

ME Consulting Solutions (MECS) is a Syrian-owned research and consulting advisory firm, dedicated to generating high-quality analysis in support of effective humanitarian and development programming. If you enjoyed our analysis, please Like and Share our posts. For information and inquiries, please contact us at info@meconsulting.solutions.